செவ்வாய், 7 ஜனவரி, 2014

சிதம்பரம் நடராஜர் கோவில் வழக்கின் தீர்ப்பு - முழுவிவரம் (ஆங்கிலத்தில்)


(சிதம்பரம் நடராஜர் கோவில் வழக்கில்,  சுப்ரீம்கோர்ட் அளித்த தீர்ப்பின் முழு விவரத்தையும் இங்கே  ஆங்கிலத்தில் அளித்துள்ளேன். இது என் நண்பர் ஒருவர் மூலம் எனக்கு மின்னஞ்சலில் வந்தது.

விரைவில், எனது வலைப்பூவில் இதை தமிழில்  மொழிபெயர்த்து வெளியிடுவேன்)



REPORTABLE
                          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                          CIVIL APPEAL NO.10620  OF 2013

      Dr. Subramanian                     Swamy
      ...Appellant


                 Versus


      State         of          Tamil          Nadu          &          Ors.
      ...Respondents


With

                          CIVIL APPEAL NO.10621  OF 2013

      Sabhayanagar                                                    Temple
      ...Appellant


                 Versus


      State         of          Tamil          Nadu          &          Ors.
      ...Respondents


With

                          CIVIL APPEAL NO.10622  OF 2013



      T.                  Sivaraman                  &                  Ors.
      ...Appellants


                 Versus


      State         of          Tamil          Nadu          &          Ors.
      ...Respondents




                                  J U D G M E N T


      Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.


      1.         All these appeals have  been  filed  against  the  impugned
      judgment and order dated 15.9.2009 passed in  Writ  Appeal  No.181  of
      2009 by the High Court of Madras  affirming  the  judgment  and  order
      dated 2.2.2009 of the learned Single Judge  passed  in  Writ  Petition
      No.18248 of 2006 rejecting the claim of the writ  petitioner  -  Podhu
      Dikshitars to administer the Temple.
                 In Civil Appeal No. 10620/2013, the appellant  has  raised
      the issue of violation of the constitutional  rights  protected  under
      Article 26 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter referred to
      as 'Constitution') in  relation  to  the  claim  by  Podhu  Dikshitars
      (Smarthi Brahmins) to administer  the  properties  of  the  Temple  in
      question dedicated to Lord Natraja. The same gains further  importance
      as it also involves the genesis of such pre-existing rights even prior
      to the commencement of the Constitution and the extent of exercise  of
      State control under the  statutory  provisions  of  The  Madras  Hindu
      Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1951 (hereinafter referred  to
      as the 'Act 1951') as well as  the  Tamil  Nadu  Hindu  Religious  and
      Charitable Endowments Act 1959 (hereinafter referred to  as  the  'Act
      1959').
                  Civil  Appeal  No.  10621/2013  is  on  behalf  of   Podhu
      Dikshitars claiming the same relief and Civil  Appeal  No.  10622/2013
      has been filed by the appellants supporting the claim of the appellant
      in Civil Appeal No. 10621/2013.


      2.         For convenience in addressing the parties and deciding  the
      appeals, we have taken Civil Appeal  No.  10620/2013  as  the  leading
      appeal. The facts and circumstances giving rise to the appeal  are  as
      under:
      A.         That Sri Sabhanayagar Temple  at  Chidambaram  (hereinafter
      referred to as the 'Temple') is in existence  since  times  immemorial
      and had been administered for a long time  by  Podhu  Dikshitars  (all
      male married members of the families of Smarthi Brahmins who claim  to
      have been called for the establishment of the Temple in  the  name  of
      Lord Natraja).
      B.         The State of Madras enacted the Madras Hindu Religious  and
      Charitable Endowments Act, 1927 (hereinafter referred to as  the  'Act
      1927'),  which  was  repealed  by  the  Act  1951.    A   Notification
      No.G.O.Ms.894 dated 28.8.1951 notifying the Temple to be subjected  to
      the provisions of Chapter VI of the Act 1951  was  issued.   The  said
      notification enabled the Government to promulgate a  Scheme   for  the
      management of the Temple.
      C.         In pursuance to the same, the  Hindu  Religious  Endowments
      Board, Madras (hereinafter called the 'Board') appointed an  Executive
      Officer for the management of the Temple  in  1951  vide  order  dated
      28.8.1951 etc.
      D.          The  Dikshitars,  i.e.  respondent   no.6   and/or   their
      predecessors in interest challenged the said  orders  dated  28.8.1951
      and 31.8.1951 by filing Writ Petition  nos. 379-380 of 1951 before the
      Madras High Court which were allowed vide  judgment  and  order  dated
      13.12.1951 quashing the  said  orders,  holding  that  the  Dikshitars
      constituted a 'religious denomination' and  their  position  vis-`-vis
      the Temple was analogous to muttadhipati of a  mutt;  and  the  orders
      impugned therein were violative of the provisions of Article 26 of the
      Constitution.
      E.         Aggrieved, the State of Madras filed  appeals  before  this
      Court,  which  stood  dismissed  vide  order  dated  9.2.1954  as  the
      notification  was  withdrawn  by  the  State-respondents.   After  the
      judgment in the aforesaid case as well as in The  Commissioner,  Hindu
      Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of  Sri
      Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282 (hereinafter referred to as 'Shirur  Mutt
      Case'), the Act 1951 was repealed by the Act 1959. Section 45  thereof
      empowers the Statutory Authorities to appoint an Executive Officer  to
      administer the religious  institutions.  However,  certain  safeguards
      have been provided under various provisions including Section  107  of
      the Act 1959.
      F.         On 31.7.1987, the Commissioner of  religious  endowment  in
      exercise of his power  under  the  Act  1959  appointed  an  Executive
      Officer.  Consequent thereto, the Commissioner HR&CE passed  an  order
      dated 5.8.1987  defining  the  duties  and  powers  of  the  Executive
      Officer, so appointed for the administration of the Temple.
      G.         Aggrieved, the respondent no.6 challenged the said order by
      filing Writ Petition No.7843  of  1987.   The  High  Court  of  Madras
      granted stay of operation of the said order dated  5.8.1987.  However,
      the writ petition  stood  dismissed  vide  judgment  and  order  dated
      17.2.1997.
      H.         Aggrieved, the respondent no.6 preferred Writ Appeal No.145
      of 1997 and the High Court vide its judgment and order dated 1.11.2004
      disposed of the said writ appeal giving liberty to  respondent no.6 to
      file a revision petition before the Government under  Section  114  of
      the Act 1959 as the writ petition had been  filed  without  exhausting
      the statutory remedies available to the said respondent.
      I.         The revision petition  was  preferred,  however,  the  same
      stood dismissed vide order dated 9.5.2006 rejecting the contention  of
      the  respondent  no.6  that  the   order   dated   5.8.1987   violated
      respondent's fundamental rights under Article 26 of  the  Constitution
      observing that by virtue  of  the  operation  of  law  i.e.  statutory
      provisions of Sections 45 and 107 of the Act 1959,  such  rights  were
      not available to the  respondent  no.6.  In  this  order,  the  entire
      history of the litigation was discussed and it was  also  pointed  out
      that the Executive Officer had taken charge of the Temple on 20.3.1997
      and had been looking after the management of the  Temple  since  then.
      The said order also  revealed  that  the  respondent  no.6  could  not
      furnish proper accounts of movable and  immovable  properties  of  the
      Temple and recorded the following finding of fact:
           "The  powers  given  to   the   Executive   Officer,   are   the
           administration of the Temple and  its  properties  and  maintain
           these in a secular manner. Hence, the rights of the  petitioners
           are not at all  affected  or  interfered  with,  in  any  manner
           whatsoever the aim and reason  behind  the  appointment  of  the
           Executive Officer is not for removing the petitioners  who  call
           themselves as trustees to this Temple." (Emphasis added)


      J.         The respondent no.6 preferred  Writ  Petition  No.18248  of
      2006 for setting aside the order dated 9.5.2006 which was dismissed by
      the High Court vide judgment and order dated 2.2.2009  observing  that
      the judgment referred to hereinabove in Writ Petition (C) Nos. 379-380
      of 1951 titled Marimuthu Dikshitar v. The  State  of  Madras  &  Anr.,
      reported in 1952 (1) MLJ 557, wherein it was held that Dikshitars were
      a 'religious denomination', would not operate as res judicata.
      K.         Aggrieved, the respondent no.6 filed Writ Appeal No.181  of
      2009. The present appellant Dr. Subramanian Swamy was allowed  by  the
      High Court to be impleaded as  a  party.  The  Writ  Appeal  has  been
      dismissed vide impugned judgment and order dated 15.9.2009.
                 Hence, these appeals.


      3.         The appellant-in-person has submitted that  Article  26  of
      the Constitution confers certain fundamental rights upon the  citizens
      and particularly, on a 'religious denomination' which can  neither  be
      taken away nor abridged.  In the instant case, the Dikshitars had been
      declared by this Court, in a lis between Dikshitars and the State  and
      the Religious Endowments Commissioner, that they were an  acknowledged
      `religious denomination' and in that capacity  they  had  a  right  to
      administer the properties of  the  Temple.   Though  in  view  of  the
      provisions of Section 45 read with Section 107 of the  Act  1959,  the
      State may have a power to regulate the activities of the  Temple,  but
      lacks competence to divest the Dikshitars from their right  to  manage
      and administer the Temple  and  its  properties.  It  was  strenuously
      contended that the High Court committed an error by holding  that  the
      earlier judgment of the Division Bench in Marimuthu Dikshitar  (Supra)
      would not operate as res judicata.  Therefore, the appeal deserves  to
      be allowed.


      4.         Per contra, Shri Dhruv  Mehta  and  Shri  Colin  Gonsalves,
      learned Senior counsel, and Shri Yogesh Kanna, learned  counsel   have
      opposed the appeal contending that no interference is required by this
      court as the High Court has rightly held that the  aforesaid  judgment
      of the Madras High Court or the judgment of this Court in Shirur  Mutt
      case (Supra) would not operate as res judicata  even  if  the  earlier
      dispute had been  contested  between  the  same  parties  and  touches
      similar issues, for the reason that Article 26(d)  applies  only  when
      the  temple/property  is  owned  and  established  by  the  'religious
      denomination'. In the instant case, the Temple  is  neither  owned  by
      respondent No. 6, nor established by it.  Thus, the appeal  is  liable
      to be dismissed.
                 Shri Subramonium Prasad,  learned  Addl.  Advocate  General
      appearing for the State and the Statutory authorities has opposed  the
      appeal contending that the Executive Officer  has  been  appointed  to
      assist the Podhu Dikshitars and to work in collaboration with them and
      the said respondent has not been divested of its powers at all, so far
      as the religious matters are concerned. Thus,  the  matter  should  be
      examined considering these aspects.
      5.         We have considered the rival submissions  made  by  learned
      counsel for the parties and perused the record.
      6.         Before entering into the merits of  the  case,  it  may  be
      relevant to refer to the relevant statutory provisions.
                 Section 27 of the Act 1959 provides that the trustee would
      be bound to obey all lawful orders issued by  the  Government  or  the
      statutory authorities.
                 Section 45 of the Act 1959 provides  for  appointment  and
      duties of Executive Officer and relevant part thereof reads:
           "(1)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  this  Act,   the
           Commissioner may appoint, subject to such conditions as  may  be
           prescribed, an Executive Officer for any  religious  institution
           other than a Math or a specific endowment attached to a Math.
           (2)  The  Executive  Officer  shall  exercise  such  powers  and
           discharge  such  duties  as  may  be  assigned  to  him  by  the
           Commissioner.
           Provided that only such powers and duties as  appertain  to  the
           administration of the properties of the  religious  institutions
           referred  to  in  sub-section  (1)  shall  be  assigned  to  the
           executive officer.
                       xxx                      xxx                      xxx
                 xxx
           On the other hand, Section 107 of the Act 1959 provides that the
      Act would not affect the rights guaranteed under  Article  26  of  the
      Constitution.  It reads:
                 "Nothing contained in this Act shall,  save  as  otherwise
           provided in Section 106 and in Clause (2) of Article 25  of  the
           Constitution, be deemed to confer any power or impose  any  duty
           in contravention  of  the  rights  conferred  on  any  religious
           denomination or  any  Section  thereof  by  Article  26  of  the
           Constitution."
         Section 116 of the Act 1959 reads as under:
         "116.  Power to make rules-
           (1)   The Government may, by notification, make rules  to  carry
           out the purposes of this Act.
           (2)   Without prejudice  to  the  generality  of  the  foregoing
           power, such rules may provide for-
                 (i)     all matters expressly required or allowed  by  this
                 Act to be prescribed;
                          xx              xx              xx
           (3)   All rules made and all notifications issued under this Act
           shall, as soon as possible after they are  made  or  issued,  be
           placed on the table of the Legislative  Assembly  and  shall  be
           subject to such modifications by way of amendment or  repeal  as
           the Legislative Assembly may make either in the same session  or
           in the next session."


      7.         Article 26 of the  Constitution  provides  for  freedom  to
      manage religious affairs and it reads as under:
           "26. Freedom to manage religious affairs  -  Subject  to  public
           order, morality and health, every religious denomination or  any
           section thereof shall have the right -


               (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and
               charitable purposes;


               (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;


               (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and


               (d) to administer such property in accordance with law."

      (Emphasis added)


      8.         The word "such" has to be understood in the context it  has
      been used.  A Constitution Bench of this  Court  in  Central  Bank  of
      India v. Ravindra & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 3095 dealt with the word  "such"
      and held as under:
           "43. Webster defines "such" as "having the particular quality or
           character specified; certain, representing the object as already
           particularised  in  terms  which  are  not  mentioned.  In   New
           Webster's Dictionary and Thesaurus, meaning of "such"  is  given
           as "of a kind previously or about to be mentioned or implied; of
           the same quality as something just mentioned (used to avoid  the
           repetition of one word twice in a  sentence);  of  a  degree  or
           quantity  stated  or  implicit;  the  same  as  something   just
           mentioned (used to avoid repetition  of  one  word  twice  in  a
           sentence); that part of something just stated  or  about  to  be
           stated". Thus, generally speaking, the use of the word "such" as
           an adjective prefixed to a noun is indicative of the draftsman's
           intention  that  he   is   assigning   the   same   meaning   or
           characteristic to the noun as has been previously  indicated  or
           that he is referring to something which has  been  said  before.
           This principle has all the more vigorous  application  when  the
           two places employing the same expression, at earlier  place  the
           expression having been  defined  or  characterised  and  at  the
           latter place having been qualified by use of  the  word  "such",
           are situated in close proximity."
      (See also: Ombalika Das & Anr. v. Hulisa Shaw, AIR 2002 SC 1685).


      9.         The aforesaid provisions make it clear that the  rights  of
      the 'denominational religious institutions' are to  be  preserved  and
      protected from any invasion by the State as guaranteed  under  Article
      26 of the Constitution, and as statutorily embodied in Section 107  of
      the Act 1959.


      10.        Undoubtedly, the object and purpose of enacting Article  26
      of the Constitution is to protect the rights conferred  therein  on  a
      `religious denomination` or a section  thereof.  However,  the  rights
      conferred under Article 26 are subject to public order,  morality  and
      health and not subject to any other  provision  of  Part  III  of  the
      Constitution as the limitation has been prescribed by the  law  makers
      by virtue of Article 25 of the Constitution.
           The  term   'religious   denomination'   means   collection   of
      individuals having a system of  belief,  a  common  organisation;  and
      designation of a  distinct  name.   The  right  to  administration  of
      property by a 'religious denomination'  would  stand  on  a  different
      footing altogether from the right  to  maintain  its  own  affairs  in
      matters of religion.  (Vide:  Acharya  Maharajshri  Narendra  Prasadji
      Anandprasadji Maharaj etc.etc. v. The State of  Gujarat  &  Ors.,  AIR
      1974 SC 2098; T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. v.  State  of  Karnataka  &
      Ors., AIR 2003 SC 355;  and  Nallor  Marthandam  Vellalar  &  Ors.  v.
      Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments  &  Ors.,  AIR
      2003 SC 4225).


      11.        The Constitution Bench of this Court in S.  Azeez  Basha  &
      Anr. v. Union of India, AIR 1968  SC  662,   while  dealing  with  the
      rights of minority to establish educational institutions,  also  dealt
      with the provisions of Article 26 of  the  Constitution  and  observed
      that the words "establish and maintain" contained in  Article  26  (a)
      must be read conjunctively.  A 'religious denomination' can only claim
      to maintain that institution which has been established  by  it.   The
      right to maintain institutions would necessarily include the right  to
      administer them.  The right under Article 26(a)  of  the  Constitution
      will only arise where the institution is established by  a  'religious
      denomination' and only in that event, it can  claim  to  maintain  it.
      While dealing with the issue of Aligarh Muslim University, this  Court
      rejected the claim of Muslim community of the right to  administer  on
      the ground that it had not been established by  the  Muslim  community
      and, therefore, they did not have a right to maintain  the  university
      within the meaning of Article 26(a) of the Constitution.


      12.        In Khajamian Wakf Estates etc. v.  State  of  Madras  etc.,
      AIR 1971 SC 161, the Constitution Bench of this Court  held  that  the
      religious denomination can own, acquire properties and administer them
      in accordance with law.  In case they lose the  property  or  alienate
      the same, the right to administer automatically lapses for the  reason
      that property ceases to be  their  property.   Article  26(d)  of  the
      Constitution  protects  the  rights  of  'religious  denomination'  to
      establish and  administer  the  properties  as  clauses  (c)  and  (d)
      guarantee a fundamental  right to any religious denomination  to  own,
      acquire, establish and maintain such properties.


      13.        In Sri Sri Sri Lakshamana Yatendrulu &  Ors.  v.  State  of
      A.P. & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 1414, this Court examined the  constitutional
      validity of some of the provisions of the  Andhra  Pradesh  Charitable
      and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act  1987.  The  Court
      also examined the object of the scheme framed under Section 55 of  the
      said Act and held as under:
           "..That the power of the Commissioner to  frame  scheme  is  not
           absolute but is conditioned upon reasonable belief on the  basis
           of the report submitted by the  Deputy  Commissioner  and  there
           must be some material on record for  entertaining  a  reasonable
           belief that the affairs of the Math and its properties are being
           mismanaged  or  that  funds  are  misappropriated  or  that  the
           mathadhipathi grossly neglected in performing his duties.  Prior
           enquiry in that behalf is duly made in accordance with the rules
           prescribed  thereunder.  The  members  of  the   committee    so
           appointed shall be the persons who are genuinely  interested  in
           the proper management of the Math, management of the  properties
           and useful utilization of the funds for the purpose of which the
           endowment is created. Thus, the paramount consideration is  only
           proper management of the Math and utilisation of the  funds  for
           the purpose  of  the  Math  as  per  its  customs,  usage  etc."
                  (Emphasis added)


      The Court further held:
           "Such a scheme can be only to run day-to-day  management of  the
           endowment and the committee would be of supervisory mechanism as
           overall         incharge         of          the          Math."
                            (Emphasis added)


         As the Act 1987 did not provide the duration for which  the  scheme
      would remain in force, the court held that "the duration of the scheme
      thus framed may also be specified either in the original scheme or one
      upheld with modification, if any, in appeal." The Court held:
           "36.  The  object  of  Section  55  appears  to  be  to   remedy
           mismanagement of the math or misutilisation of the funds of  the
           math  or  neglect  in  its  management.  The  scheme   envisages
           modification or its cancellation thereof, which  would  indicate
           that the scheme is of a temporary nature and duration  till  the
           evil, which was recorded by the Commissioner after due  enquiry,
           is remedied or a fit person is nominated as mathadhipathi and is
           recognised by the Commissioner. The scheme  is  required  to  be
           cancelled as soon as the nominated mathadhipathi assumes  office
           and starts administering the math  and  manages  the  properties
           belonging to, endowed  or  attached  to  the  math  or  specific
           endowment."
                         (Emphasis added)


         Thus, this Court clarified that there cannot  be  super-session  of
      administration in perpetuity. It is a temporary measure till the  evil
      gets remedied.


      14.        In the aforesaid backdrop, we  shall  examine  the  present
      appeals.
           The learned  Single  Judge  while  deciding  Writ  Petition  No.
      18248/2006 examined the case raising the following question:
           "Observations of the Division Bench in 1952  (1)  MLJ  557  that
           Podhu Dikshitars are a 'denomination' are to be  tested  in  the
           light of well-settled principles laid down in various  decisions
           of the Supreme Court."
         The learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench  made  it  a
      pivotal point while dealing with the case.


      15.        The Constitution Bench of this Court in Shirur Mutt (Supra)
      categorically held that a law which takes away the right to administer
       the religious denomination altogether  and  vests  it  in  any  other
      authority would amount to a violation of right  guaranteed  in  clause
      (d) of Article 26 of the Constitution.  Therefore, the law  could  not
      divest the  administration  of  religious  institution  or  endowment.
      However, the State may have a general right to regulate the  right  of
      administration of a religious or charitable institution  or  endowment
      and by such a law, State may also choose to impose  such  restrictions
      whereof as are felt most acute and provide a  remedy  therefore.  (See
      also: Ratilal Panachand Gandhi & Ors. v. State of Bombay &  Ors.,  AIR
      1954 SC 388; and Pannalal Bansilal Pitti & Ors. v.  State  of  A.P.  &
      Anr.,  AIR 1996 SC 1023).


      16.        The Shirur Mutt case (Supra) had been heard by the Division
      Bench of the Madras High Court alongwith Marimuthu Dikshitar  (Supra),
      and against both the judgments  appeals  were  preferred  before  this
      court. However, in  the  case  of  respondent  no.6,  the  appeal  was
      dismissed  as  the  State  of  Madras  had  withdrawn   the   impugned
      notification, while in Shirur  Mutt  case  the  judgment  came  to  be
      delivered wherein this Court held as under:
           "15.  As regards Art. 26. the first question  is,  what  is  the
           precise meaning or  connotation  of  the  expression  "religious
           denomination"  and  whether  a  Math  could  come  within   this
           expression. The word "denomination"  has  been  defined  in  the
           Oxford Dictionary to mean "a collection of  individuals  classed
           together under the same name : a religious sect or body having a
           common faith and organisation and designated  by  a  distinctive
           name". It is well known that the practice of setting up Maths as
           centres  of   theological   teaching   was   started   by   Shri
           Sankaracharya and was followed by various teachers  since  then.
           After  Sankara  came  a  galaxy  of   religious   teachers   and
           philosophers who founded the different sects and  sub  sects  of
           the Hindu religion that we find in India at the present day.
                 Each one of such sects or sub-sects can certainly be called
           a religious denomination, as it is designated by  a  distinctive
           name, --in many cases it the name of the founder --- and  has  a
           common faith and common spiritual organization. The followers of
           Ramanuja,  who  are  known  by  the  name  of  Shri  Vaishnabas,
           undoubtedly constitute a religious denomination; and so  do  the
           followers of Madhwacharya and other religious teachers. It is  a
           fact well established by tradition that  the  Udipi  Maths  were
           founded  by  Madhwacharya  himself  and  the  trustees  and  the
           beneficiaries of these Maths profess to  be  followers  of  that
           teacher. The High Court has found that the Math in  question  is
           in charge of the Sivalli Brahmins who constitute  a  Section  of
           the followers of Madhwacharya.As Art. 26 contemplates not merely
           a religious denomination but also a Section thereof, the Math or
           the spiritual fraternity represented by it can legitimately come
           within the purview of this Article.
           16. The other thing that remains to be considered in  regard  to
           Art. 26 is, what, is the scope of  clause  (b)  of  the  Article
           which speaks of management 'of its own  affairs  in  matters  of
           religion?" The language undoubtedly suggests that there could be
           other affairs of a religious denomination or a  Section  thereof
           which are not matter of religion  and  to  which  the  guarantee
           given by this clause would not apply. The question is, where  is
           the line to be drawn between what are matters  of  religion  and
           what are not?
                 xx                      xx               xx
           22.   Under Art. 26(b), therefore a  religious  denomination  or
           organization enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of  deciding
           as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according  to  the
           tenets of the religion they hold and no  outside  authority  has
           any jurisdiction  to  interfere  with  their  decision  in  such
           matters."


         This Court upheld the validity of Section 58 of the Act 1951  which
      had been struck down by the  Division  Bench  which  is  analogous  to
      Section 64 of the Act 1959.


      17.        In view of the provisions of Sections 44 and 45(2)  of  the
      Act 1959, the State Government can  regulate  the  secular  activities
      without interfering with the religious activities.


      18.        The issues involved herein are  as  to  whether  Dikshitars
      constitute a 'religious denomination' and whether they have a right to
      participate in the administration of the Temple.  In  fact,  both  the
      issues stood finally determined by  the  High  Court  in  the  earlier
      judgment of Marimuthu Dikhsitars (Supra) referred to hereinabove  and,
      thus, doctrine of res judicata is applicable in full force.


      19.        The Division Bench of Madras High Court while deciding  the
      dispute earlier in Marimuthu Dikshitar (Supra), traced the history  of
      Dikshitars and examined their rights, etc.  The Court concluded:
           "Looking at  it  from  the  point  of  view,  whether  the  Podu
           Dikshitars are a denomination, and  whether  their  right  as  a
           denomination is to any extent infringed within  the  meaning  of
           Article 26, it seems to us that it is a clear case, in which  it
           can safely be said that the  Podu  Dikshitars  who  are  Smartha
           Brahmins, form and constitute a religious denomination or in any
           event, a section thereof.  They are even a closed body,  because
           no other Smartha Brahmin who is not a Dikshitar is  entitled  to
           participate in the administration or in the worship  or  in  the
           services to God.  It is their exclusive and sole privilege which
           has been recognized and established for over several centuries.
                 In the case of Sri  Sabhanayakar  Temple  at  Chidambaram,
           with which we are concerned in this petition, it should be clear
           from what we have stated earlier  in  this  judgment,  that  the
           position of the Dikshitars, labelled trustees of this Temple, is
           virtually analogous to that of a Matathipathi of a Mutt,  except
           that  the  Podu  Dikshitars  of  this  Temple,  functioning   as
           trustees, will not have the same dominion over the income of the
           properties of  the  Temple  which  the  Matathipathi  enjoys  in
           relation to  the  income  from  the  Mutt  and  its  properties.
           Therefore, the sections which we held ultra vires in relation to
           Mutts and Matathipathis will  also  be  ultra  vires  the  State
           Legislature in relation to Sri Sabhanayakar Temple,  Chidambaram
           and the Podu Dikshitars who have the  right  to  administer  the
           affairs and the properties of the Temple.  As  we  have  already
           pointed out even more than the case of the Shivalli Brahmins, it
           can be asserted  that  the  Dikshitars  of  Chidambaram  form  a
           religious denomination within the meaning of Article 26  of  the
           Constitution.
           We certify under Article 132 of the Constitution that  it  is  a
           fit  case  for  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court.    Notification
           quashed."
           (Emphasis added)


      20.        On the basis of the certificate of fitness,  the  State  of
      Madras preferred Civil Appeal No.39 of 1953 before this Court  against
      the said judgment and order of the Madras High Court, which was  heard
      by the Constitution Bench of this Court  on  9.2.1954.   However,  the
      said appeal stood dismissed as the  State  withdrew  the  notification
      impugned therein.  Relevant part of the order runs as under :
           "The Appeal and the Civil Miscellaneous Petition above mentioned
           being called on for hearing before this Court on the 9th day  of
           February, 1954 upon hearing the Advocate-General of  Madras   on
           behalf of the Appellants and counsel  for  the  respondents  and
           upon the said advocate-General appearing on behalf of the  State
           of Madras agreeing to withdraw the notification G.O. Ms.  No.894
           Rural Welfare dated  28.8.1951  published  in  Fort  St.  George
           Gazette dated 4.9.1951 in the matter of the Sabhanayagar Temple,
           Chidambaram, Chidambaram Taluk, South Arcot District/the  Temple
           concerned in this appeal/this Court doth order that  the  appeal
           and the civil miscellaneous petition above mentioned be and  the
           same are hereby dismissed."


      21.        It is evident from  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  of
      Madras,  which  attained  finality   as   the   State   withdrew   the
      notification, that the Court recognised:
        a) That Dikshitars, who are Smarthi Brahmins, form and constitute a
           'religious denomination';
        b) Dikshitars are entitled to participate in administration of  the
           Temple; and
        c) It was their exclusive privilege which had been  recognised  and
           established for over several centuries.


      22.        It is not a case  to  examine  whether  in  the  facts  and
      circumstances of the case, the judgments  of  this  court  in  various
      cases are required to be followed or the ratio thereof is  binding  in
      view of the provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution.  Rather the
      sole question is whether an issue in a case between the same  parties,
      which had been  finally  determined  could  be  negated  relying  upon
      interpretation of law given subsequently in some other cases, and  the
      answer is in  the  negative.  More  so,  nobody  can  claim  that  the
      fundamental rights can be waived by the person  concerned  or  can  be
      taken  away  by  the  State  under  the  garb  of  regulating  certain
      activities.


      23.        The scope of application of doctrine of res judicata is  in
      question.
         The literal meaning of "res" is "everything that may form an object
      of rights and includes an object, subject-matter or status"  and  "res
      judicata" literally means "a matter adjudged a thing judicially  acted
      upon or decided; a  thing  or  matter  settled  by  judgments".   "Res
      judicata pro veritate accipitur" is the full maxim which has, over the
      years, shrunk to mere "res judicata", which means that res judicata is
      accepted for truth.


      24.        The doctrine contains the rule  of  conclusiveness  of  the
      judgment which is based partly on the  maxim  of  Roman  jurisprudence
      "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" (it concerns the State that
      there be an end to law suits) and partly on the maxim "nemo debet  bis
      vexari pro uno et eadem causa" (no man should be vexed twice over  for
      the same cause).
         Even an erroneous decision  on  a  question  of  law  attracts  the
      doctrine of res judicata between the parties to it.   The  correctness
      or otherwise of a judicial decision  has no bearing upon the  question
      whether or not it  operates  as  res  judicata.  (Vide:  Shah  Shivraj
      Gopalji v. ED-, Appakadh Ayiassa Bi &  Ors.,  AIR  1949  PC  302;  and
      Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee & Ors.,  AIR  1953  SC  65).




      25.        In Smt. Raj Lakshmi Dasi & Ors. v. Banamali Sen & Ors., AIR
      1953 SC 33, this  Court   while  dealing  with  the  doctrine  of  res
      judicata referred to and relied upon the judgment in Sheoparsan  Singh
      v. Ramnandan Singh, AIR 1916 PC 78 wherein it  had  been  observed  as
      under:
           "........ the rule of res judicata,  while  founded  on  ancient
           precedents, is dictated by a wisdom which is for  all  time.....
           Though the rule of the Code may be traced to an English  source,
           it embodies a doctrine in no way opposed to the  spirit  of  the
           law as expounded by the  Hindu  commentators.  Vijnanesvara  and
           Nilakantha include the plea of a  former  judgment  among  those
           allowed by law,  each  citing  for  this  purpose  the  text  of
           Katyayana, who describes the plea  thus:  'If  a  person  though
           defeated at law, sue again, he should be  answered,  ''you  were
           defeated  formerly".  This  is  called  the   plea   of   former
           judgment.'... And so the application of the rule by  the  courts
           in India should be influenced by no technical considerations  of
           form, but by matter of substance within the  limits  allowed  by
           law''


      26.        This Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal &  Ors.  v.  Smt.  Deorajin
      Debi & Anr., AIR 1960 SC 941 explained the scope of principle of  res-
      judicata observing as under:
           "7. The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving
           a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is  that  once  a
           res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged  again.  Primarily  it
           applies as between past litigation and future litigation, When a
           matter - whether on a question of fact or a question  of  law  -
           has been decided between two parties in one suit  or  proceeding
           and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to
           a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal
           lies, neither  party  will  be  allowed  in  a  future  suit  or
           proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again.
           This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to  suits
           in S. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even  where  S.  11
           does not apply, the principle of res judicata has  been  applied
           by courts for the purpose of achieving finality  in  litigation.
           The result of this is that the original court  as  well  as  any
           higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the  basis
           that the previous decision was correct."
         A similar view has been re-iterated by this court in Daryao &  Ors.
      v.  The State of U.P.  &  Ors.,  AIR  1961  SC  1457;  Greater  Cochin
      Development Authority v. Leelamma Valson & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 952;  and
      Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 626.


      27.         The  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  Amalgamated
      Coalfields Ltd. & Anr. v. Janapada Sabha Chhindwara & Ors.,  AIR  1964
      SC 1013, considered the issue  of  res  judicata  applicable  in  writ
      jurisdiction and held as under:
              "...Therefore,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  general
           principle of res judicata applies to writ petitions filed  under
           Article 32 or Article 226. It is necessary to emphasise that the
           application of the doctrine of res  judicata  to  the  petitions
           filed under Art. 32 does not in any way  impair  or  affect  the
           content of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens  of
           India. It only seeks to regulate the manner in  which  the  said
           rights could be successfully asserted and vindicated  in  courts
           of law."


      28.        In  Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board,  Peermade  &
      Anr.,  (1999) 5 SCC  590,  this  Court  has  explained  the  scope  of
      finality of the judgment of this Court observing as under:
            "One important consideration  of  public  policy  is  that  the
           decision pronounced by courts of competent  jurisdiction  should
           be final, unless they are modified or reversed by the  appellate
           authority and other principle that no one should be made to face
           the same kind of litigation twice ever because such a  procedure
           should be contrary to consideration of fair  play  and  justice.
           Rule  of  res  judicata  prevents  the  parties  to  a  judicial
           determination from litigating the same question over again  even
           though the determination may even be demonstratedly wrong.  When
           the proceedings have attained finality, parties are bound by the
           judgment and are estopped from questioning it."
      (See also: Burn & Co., Calcutta v. Their Employees, AIR  1957  SC  38;
      G.K. Dudani & Ors. v. S.D. Sharma & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 1455; and  Ashok
      Kumar Srivastav v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. &  Ors.,  AIR  1998  SC
      2046).


      29.        A three-Judge Bench of this court in The State of Punjab v.
      Bua Das Kaushal, AIR 1971 SC 1676 considered the issue and came to the
      conclusion that if necessary facts were present in  the  mind  of  the
      parties and had gone into by the  court,  in  such  a  fact-situation,
      absence of specific plea in written statement and framing of  specific
      issue of res judicata by the court is immaterial.


      30.        A similar view has been re-iterated by this court in  Union
      of India v. Nanak Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1370 observing as under:
           "This Court in Gulabchand Chhotalal v.  State  of  Gujarat,  AIR
           1965 SC 1153 observed that the provisions of Section 11  of  the
           Code of Civil Procedure are not exhaustive with respect  to  all
           earlier decision operating as  res  judicata  between  the  same
           parties on the  same  matter  in  controversy  in  a  subsequent
           regular suit, and on the general principle of res judicata,  any
           previous decision on a matter in controversy, decided after full
           contest or after affording fair opportunity to  the  parties  to
           prove their case by a Court competent to decide it, will operate
           as res  judicata  in  a  subsequent  regular  suit.  It  is  not
           necessary  that  the  Court  deciding  the  matter  formerly  be
           competent to decide the  subsequent  suit  or  that  the  former
           proceeding and the subsequent suit have the same subject-matter.
           There is no good reason to preclude, such decisions  on  matters
           in controversy in writ proceedings under Article 226 or  Article
           32 of  the  Constitution  from  operating  as  res  judicata  in
           subsequent regular suits on  the  same  matters  in  controversy
           between the same parties and thus to give limited effect to  the
           principle of the finality of decisions after full contest."


      31.        It is a settled legal proposition that  the  ratio  of  any
      decision must be understood in the background of  the  facts  of  that
      case and the case is only an authority for what it  actually  decides,
      and not what logically follows from it.  "The court should  not  place
      reliance on  decisions  without  discussing  as  to  how  the  factual
      situation fits in with the fact-situation of  the  decision  on  which
      reliance is placed."
      32.        Even otherwise, a different view on the  interpretation  of
      the law may be possible but the same should not be accepted in case it
      has the effect of unsettling transactions which had been entered  into
      on the  basis  of  those  decisions,  as  reopening  past  and  closed
      transactions or settled titles all over would  stand  jeopardized  and
      this would create a chaotic situation which may bring  instability  in
      the society.
         The declaration that  "Dikshitars  are  religious  denomination  or
      section thereof" is in fact a declaration of their status  and  making
      such declaration is in fact a judgment in rem.


      33.        In Madan Mohan Pathak & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.,  AIR
      1978 SC 803, a seven-Judge Bench of  this  Court  dealt  with  a  case
      wherein the question arose as to  whether  the  order  passed  by  the
      Calcutta High Court  issuing  writ  of  mandamus  directing  the  Life
      Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as L.I.C.)  to
      pay cash bonus for the year 1975-76 to its class 3 and 4 employees  in
      terms of the settlement between the  parties  was  allowed  to  become
      final.  Immediately after  the  pronouncement  of  the  judgment,  the
      Parliament enacted the LIC (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976. The
      appeal filed against the judgment  of  Calcutta  High  Court  was  not
      pressed by LIC and the said judgment  was  allowed  to  become  final.
      This Court rejected the contention of the LIC  that  in  view  of  the
      intervention of legislation, it was not liable to meet  the  liability
      under the said judgment.  The Court held that there was nothing in the
      Act which nullifies the effect of the said judgment or which could set
      at naught the judgment or take away the binding character of the  said
      judgment against LIC.  Thus, the LIC was liable to make the payment in
      accordance with the said judgment and it could not  be  absolved  from
      the obligation imposed by the said judgment.


      34.        This Court, while considering the  binding  effect  of  the
      judgment of this Court, in State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Mr. Justice R.A.
      Mehta (Retd.) & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 693, held:
             "There can be no dispute with  respect  to  the  settled  legal
           proposition that a judgment of this Court is binding,.....It  is
           also correct to state that, even if a particular issue  has  not
           been agitated earlier, or a particular  argument  was  advanced,
           but was not considered, the said  judgment  does  not  lose  its
           binding effect, provided that the point with reference to  which
           an argument is subsequently advanced, has actually been decided.
           The decision therefore, would not lose  its  authority,  "merely
           because  it  was  badly  argued,  inadequately   considered   or
           fallaciously reasoned". (Vide: Smt.  Somavanti  &  Ors.  v.  The
           State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 151;  Ballabhdas  Mathuradas
           Lakhani & Ors. v. Municipal Committee,  Malkapur,  AIR  1970  SC
           1002; Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1980  SC
           1762; and Director of Settlements, A.P. & Ors. v. M.R. Apparao &
           Anr., AIR 2002 SC 1598)."


      35.        The issue can be examined from another  angle.  Explanation
      to Order XLVII, Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure,  1908  (hereinafter
      referred to as the 'CPC') provides that if the decision on a  question
      of law on which the judgment of the court is  based,  is  reversed  or
      modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in  any  other
      case, it shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.  Thus,
      even an erroneous decision  cannot  be  a  ground  for  the  court  to
      undertake  review,  as  the  first   and   foremost   requirement   of
      entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of  which  is
      sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the  order  and
      in absence of any such error, finality attached to the  judgment/order
      cannot be disturbed. (Vide: Rajendra Kumar & Ors. v. Rambhai  &  Ors.,
      AIR 2003 SC 2095).


      36.        In view of the fact that the rights of the respondent no. 6
      to administer the Temple had already been finally  determined  by  the
      High Court in 1951 and attained finality as State  of  Madras  (as  it
      then was) had withdrawn the notification in  the  appeal  before  this
      Court, we are of the considered opinion  that  the  State  authorities
      under the Act 1959 could not pass  any  order  denying  those  rights.
      Admittedly, the Act 1959 had been enacted after pronouncement  of  the
      said judgment but there is nothing in the Act taking away  the  rights
      of the respondent no. 6, declared by the court, in the  Temple  or  in
      the administration thereof.


      37.        The fundamental rights as protected under Article 26 of the
      Constitution are already indicated for observance in  Section  107  of
      the Act 1959 itself. Such rights cannot be treated to have been waived
      nor its protection denied. Consequently, the power to  supersede   the
      functions of a `religious denomination` is to be  read  as  regulatory
      for a certain purpose and for a limited duration, and not an authority
      to virtually abrogate the rights of administration conferred on it.
           In such  a  fact-situation,  it  was  not  permissible  for  the
      authorities to pass any  order  divesting  the  said  respondent  from
      administration of the Temple and  thus,  all  orders  passed  in  this
      regard are  liable  to  be  held  inconsequential  and  unenforceable.
      More  so,  the  judgments  relied  upon   by   the   respondents   are
      distinguishable on facts.


      38.        Thus, in view of the above, it was not permissible for  the
      High Court to assume that it had jurisdiction to sit in appeal against
      its earlier judgment  of  1951  which  had  attained  finality.   Even
      otherwise, the High Court has committed an error in holding  that  the
      said judgment in Marimuthu Dikshitar (Supra) would not operate as  res
      judicata.  Even if the Temple was neither established,  nor  owned  by
      the said respondent, nor such a  claim  has  ever  been  made  by  the
      Dikshitars, once the High Court in  earlier  judgment  has  recognised
      that they constituted `religious denomination' or section thereof  and
      had right to administer the Temple since they had  been  administering
      it for several centuries, the question of re-examination of any  issue
      in this regard could not arise.


      39.        Relevant features of the order passed by  the  Commissioner
      are that the Executive Officer shall  be  incharge  of  all  immovable
      properties of the institution; the Executive Officer shall be entitled
      to the custody of all immovables, livestock and grains; the  Executive
      Officer  shall be entitled to receive all the income in cash and  kind
      and all offerings; all such income  and  offerings  shall  be  in  his
      custody; all the office holders and  servants  shall  work  under  the
      immediate control and superintendence of the Executive Officer, though
      subject to the disciplinary control of the Secretary of the respondent
      no.6., etc.


      40.        Section 116 of the Act 1959 enables the State Government to
      frame rules to carry out the purpose  of  the  Act  for  "all  matters
      expressly required or allowed by this Act to be prescribed".  Clause 3
      thereof  requires  approval  of  the  rules  by  the  House  of  State
      Legislature. The Executive Officer so appointed  by  the  Commissioner
      has to  function  as  per  assigned  duties  and  to  the  extent  the
      Commissioner directs him to perform.


      41.        It is submitted by Dr. Swamy that rules have to  be  framed
      defining the circumstances under which the powers under Section 45  of
      the Act 1959 can be exercised.  The  Act  1959  does  not  contemplate
      unguided or unbridled functioning. On the contrary,  the  prescription
      of rules to be framed by the State Government under Sections 116  read
      with Sections 45 and 65, etc. of  the  Act  1959  indicates  that  the
      legislature only intended to regulate and  control  any  incidence  of
      maladministration and not a  complete  replacement  by  introducing  a
      Statutory authority to administer the Temple.


      42.     Section 2(16) CPC defines the term `prescribed` as  prescribed
      by rules. Further, Section 2(18) CPC defines rules as Rules and  forms
      as contained in the First  Schedule  or  made  under  Section  122  or
      Section 125 CPC. Sections 122 and 125 CPC provide  for  power  of  the
      High Court to make rules with  respect  to  its  own  functioning  and
      procedure. Therefore, it appears that when the  legislature  uses  the
      term `prescribed`, it only refers to a power that  has  simultaneously
      been provided  for  or  is  deemed  to  have  been  provided  and  not
      otherwise.  Similarly, Section 2(n) of the  Consumer  Protection  Act,
      1986 defines prescribed as "prescribed by  rules  made  by  the  State
      Government or as the case may be, by the Central Government under  the
      Act".


      43.        Section 45 of the Act 1959 provides for appointment  of  an
      Executive Officer, subject to such conditions as  may  be  prescribed.
      The term 'prescribed' has not been defined under the Act.   Prescribed
      means prescribed by rules.  If the  word  'prescribed'  has  not  been
      defined  specifically,  the  same  would  mean  to  be  prescribed  in
      accordance with law and not otherwise.  Therefore, a particular  power
      can be exercised only if a specific enacting law  or  statutory  rules
      have been framed for that purpose. (See: Manohar  Lal  Chopra  v.  Rai
      Bahadur Rao Raja Seth  Hiralal,  AIR  1962  SC  527;  Hindustan  Ideal
      Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, AIR 1963 SC
      1083; Maharashtra SRTC v. Babu Goverdhan Regular Motor Service  Warora
      & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 1926; and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Anr.  v. BPL
      Mobile Cellular Ltd. & Ors., (2008) 13 SCC 597).


      44.        Shri Subramonium  Prasad,  learned  AAG,  has  brought  the
      judgment in M.E. Subramani & Ors. v. Commissioner, HR&CE &  Ors.,  AIR
      1976 Mad 264, to our notice,  wherein  the  Madras  High  Court  while
      dealing with these provisions held that the Commissioner  can  appoint
      an Executive Officer under Section 45 even if no conditions have  been
      prescribed in this regard. It may not be possible    to  approve  this
      view in view of the judgments of this Court referred  to  in  para  41
      supra, thus, an Executive Officer could not have been appointed in the
      absence of any rules prescribing  conditions  subject  to  which  such
      appointment could  have been made.


      45.         However,  Shri  Subramonium  Prasad,  learned   AAG,   has
      submitted that so far as the validity of Section 45 of the Act 1959 is
      concerned, it is under challenge in Writ Petition (C) No. 544 of  2009
      and the said petition had earlier been tagged with these appeals,  but
      it has been de-linked and is to be beard after the judgment  in  these
      appeals is delivered. Thus, in view of the stand taken  by  the  State
      before this court, going into the issue of validity of Section  45  of
      the Act 1959 does not arise and in that respect it has been  submitted
      in written submissions as under:
           (a)   The scheme of administration in Board's Order No.997 dated
           8.5.1933 under the Act 1927 contained various provisions  inter-
           alia  that  active  management  would  rest  in  the   committee
           consisting of nine members who were to be elected from among the
           Podhu Dikshitars (clause 4);
            (b)  At the  time  of  issuing  the  order  of  appointment  of
           Executive  Officer,  the  Podhu  Dikshitars  were   given   full
           opportunity  of  hearing  and  the  powers  and  duties  of  the
           Executive Officer as defined by the Commissioner would show that
           the religious affairs have not  been  touched  at  all  and  the
           trustees and the Executive Officers  are  jointly  managing  the
           temple.  The Podhu Dikshitars have  not  been  divested  of  the
           properties and it was not the intention of the State  Government
           to remove the trustees altogether, rather the Executive Officers
           function alongwith the trustees;
           (c)   In any event, the Podhu Dikshitars  are  trustees  in  the
           temple and they have not been divested of their properties.  The
           Executive Officer is only collaborating  with  the  trustees  in
           administering the properties. Their  religious  activities  have
           not been touched. Neither the powers of the trustees  have  been
           suspended nor the Executive Officers have been vested with their
           powers and the Executive Officers only assist  the  trustees  in
           management of the temple. It was not the intention to remove the
           trustees  altogether,  nor  the  order  of  appointment  of  the
           Executive Officer suspends the scheme already framed way back in
           1939.


      46.        Be that as it may, the case is required to be considered in
      light of the submissions made on behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu and
      particularly in view of the written submissions filed on behalf of the
      State.


      47.        Even if the management of a temple is taken over to  remedy
      the evil, the management must be handed over to the  person  concerned
      immediately after the evil stands  remedied.  Continuation  thereafter
      would  tantamount  to  usurpation  of  their  proprietary  rights   or
      violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution  in
      favour  of  the  persons  deprived.  Therefore,  taking  over  of  the
      management in such circumstances must be for a limited  period.  Thus,
      such expropriatory order requires to  be  considered  strictly  as  it
      infringes fundamental rights of  the  citizens  and  would  amount  to
      divesting them of their legitimate rights to manage and administer the
      temple for an indefinite period.  We are of the view that the impugned
      order is liable to be set aside for failure to prescribe the  duration
      for which it will be in force.
         Super-session of rights of administration cannot be of a  permanent
      enduring nature. Its life has to be reasonably fixed so as to  be  co-
      terminus with the removal of the  consequences  of  maladministration.
      The reason is that the objective  to  take  over  the  management  and
      administration is not the removal  and  replacement  of  the  existing
      administration but to  rectify  and  stump  out  the  consequences  of
      maladministration. Power to regulate does not mean power to  supersede
      the administration for indefinite period.
           Regulate  is  defined  as  to  direct;  to  direct  by  rule  or
      restriction; to direct or manage according to the  certain  standards,
      to restrain or restrict.  The word `regulate' is difficult  to  define
      as having any precise meaning.  It is a word of broad import, having a
      broad meaning and may be very comprehensive in  scope.  Thus,  it  may
      mean to control or to subject to governing principles.   Regulate  has
      different set of meaning and must take its colour from the context  in
      which it is used having regard  to  the  purpose  and  object  of  the
      legislation. The word `regulate' is elastic enough to include issuance
      of directions etc. (Vide: K. Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.,
      AIR 1985 SC 660; and Balmer Lawrie & Company  Limited  &  Ors.  Partha
      Sarathi Sen Roy & Ors., (2013) 8 SCC 345)


      48.         Even   otherwise   it   is   not   permissible   for   the
      State/Statutory  Authorities  to  supersede  the   administration   by
      adopting any oblique/circuitous method.  In Sant Lal Gupta &  Ors.  v.
      Modern Coop. Group Housing Society Ltd. & Ors.,  (2010)  13  SCC  336,
      this Court held:
              "It is a settled proposition of law that what cannot be  done
           directly, is not  permissible  to  be  done  obliquely,  meaning
           thereby, whatever is  prohibited  by  law  to  be  done,  cannot
           legally be effected by an indirect and circuitous contrivance on
           the principle of "quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et  omne
           per quod devenitur ad illud". An authority cannot  be  permitted
           to evade a law by "shift or contrivance"."


      (See also: Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh, AIR 1979 SC  381;  A.P.  Diary
      Dev. Corporation federation v. B. Narsimha Reddy & Ors.  AIR  2011  SC
      3298; and State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. v. K. Shyam  Sunder  &  Ors.  AIR
      2011 SC 3470).


      49.         We would also like to bring on  the  record  that  various
      instances    whereby    acts    of    mismanagement/maladministration/
      misappropriation alleged to have been committed  by  Podhu  Dikshitars
      have been brought to our notice. We have not gone  into  those  issues
      since we have come to the conclusion that the power under the Act 1959
      for appointment of an Executive Officer could not have been  exercised
      in the absence of any prescription  of  circumstances/  conditions  in
      which such  an  appointment  may  be  made.  More  so,  the  order  of
      appointment of the Executive Officer does not  disclose  as  for  what
      reasons and under what circumstances his appointment was necessitated.
       Even otherwise, the order in which no  period  of  its  operation  is
      prescribed, is not sustainable being ex facie arbitrary,  illegal  and
      unjust.


      50.        Thus, the appeals are  allowed.  Judgments/orders  impugned
      are set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.



                           .............................................J.

                                      (DR.           B.S.           CHAUHAN)





      .........................................J.
                        (S.A. BOBDE)
      New Delhi,
      January 6, 2014

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